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Indemnifying Corporate Officials for Williams
Act Violations
Labor can do nothing without capital, capital nothing without
labor, and neither labor nor capital can do anything without the
guiding genius of management; and management, however wise
its genius may be, can do nothing without the privileges which
the community affords.'
In recent years, the depressed state of the economy, the securities
market in particular, has produced fertile ground for corporate take-
overs and acquisitions. A particularly attractive and increasingly popular
route to such takeovers has been the the cash or exchange tender offer.'
In a takeover situation, with job, money, prestige, and power at stake,
vulnerable corporate managers may take precipitous action. Such action,
which must necessarily be quick, may not be in the best interest of the
investors. The action may possibly run afoul of various fiduciary and
statutory responsibilities, including those set forth in the Williams
Act.' In such situations, managers, whether pursuing or defending
control, may be held liable for burdensome expenses and damages.
In general, two broad purposes are served by imposing liability on
directors and managers. One is to provide compensation to the injured
investors. The other is to create an in terrorem effect to promote com-
1Address by W. L. Mackenzie King (1874-1950), Canadian Club, Montreal, Canada,
Mar. 17, 1919, quoted in J. BARTLET, FAmiLIAR QuorATroNs 931 (14th ed. 1968).
2In describing the tender offer or takeover bid, this note will refer to the various
players as the target (that firm which is the object of the bid), the raider (offeror or
bidder), target shareholders (offerees), and the respective incumbent corporate manage-
ments (officers and directors of the respective firms, differentiated when necessary).
The term "manager," when used, is meant to include directors and officers (to the level
of treasurer and secretary).
The Williams Act does not specifically define the term "tender offer." One sug-
gested definition is found in Aranow & Einhorn, Essential Ingredients of the Cash Tender
Invitation, 27 Bus. LAW. 415 (1972):
A tender offer may be defined as a public offer or solicitation by a company, an
individual or a group of persons to purchase during a fixed period of time all or
a portion of a class or classes of securities of a publicly held corporation at a
specified price or upon specified terms for cash and/or securities.
It should be noted that this definition i' not complete. Indeed, the intent of Congress
appears to have been to leave the term "tender offer" susceptible to judicial interpreta-
tion. The courts have taken up the gauntlet. See Note, The Developing Meaning of
"Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1250
(1973).
3 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-
n (1964) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)-(f) (1970)) [hereinafter referred
to as the Williams Act].
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pliance with the law. Clashing with these policies is the economic
demand that the most competent individuals be managers-a demand
that will not be met if the risks of managing are prohibitive. This
conflict of objectives-legal versus economic-reaches an apex during
a heated contest for corporate control wherein the target company's
managers, the target's shareholders, the raiding company's managers,
the raider's shareholders, and investors all have a stake in the outcome.
Clearly, the overriding objective should be to encourage the best in-
dividuals to serve as corporate managers. Yet such encouragement
must operate within the framework of the responsibilities imposed by
the legal system. One resolution is to be found in the grant or denial
of indemnification to officers and directors.
Indemnification and insurance are matters of contract arising
among the state, the corporation, and its officers and directors. State
law provides the rules for decision of such matters. Yet federal
statutes have in part pre-empted state prerogatives. In some situations
federal requirements actively operate to regulate manager indemnifica-
tion and insurance.' State courts, if asked to pass upon indemnification
agreements, should be responsive to federal policies which underlie an
imposition of manager liability while paying heed to state policies that
recognize the need for indemnification.
This note will begin with an examination of the history and theories
of the concept of indemnification, then look at the polcies and provisions
of the federal securities laws, particularly the Williams Act, and finally,
this note will suggest some guidelines for indemnification designed
to afford maximum protection to both corporate managers and the
investing public.
HISTORY AND THEORIES OF THE CONCEPT OF INDEMNIFICATION
Free market competition dictates that the most competent among
the citizenry should manage. In accordance with this requirement,
corporations must make every effort to encourage the best individuals to
serve as their officers and directors. The manager must not be dis-
couraged from defending legitimate corporate policies, or from taking
necessary risks on a project which might benefit the corporation.
Managers must be encouraged to answer strike or nuisance suits in
order to avoid damage to the corporation. As the chosen representa-
tives of the "owners," managers should be encouraged to defend their
4G. WASHINGTON & I. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE (1963)
[hereinafter referred to as WASHINGTON & BISHOP] is the classic study in this area.
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decisions, policies, and office.5 No doubt, remuneration," prestige, and
power provide an incentive to serve. However, if the risks of such
service become prohibitive, only the incompetent, the gambler, and the
crook will be found to fill these employment roles."
It appears that it is in the best interest of both the corporation and
society to prevent the risk of economic hardship from becoming too
great. This is one function which indemnification and insurance per-
form. Indemnification and insurance of officers and directors may
also create a "deep pocket" to facilitate compensation of injured in-
vestors.8 Yet the corporation, and the stockholders, should not have
to bear the risks if corporate officials are encouraged to act recklessly
or contrary to legal norms.9
Much of the law on the subject of idemnification has developed in
derivative suits.' 0 The focus in this note, however, is on third party
5 See Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953) ; WASH-
INGTON & BISHOP at 5.
C Often, outside directors are paid token sums to assume positions of responsibility
which may nonetheless leave them open to considerable personal liability. See generally
G. WASHINGTON & V. ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXEcUTE (3d ed.
1962).
7 This was the fear expressed by the corporate community following Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
The court in Globus denied indemnification to an underwriter for liabilities incurred due
to a violation of Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970). See also
Escott v. Bar Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Kroll, Some Re-
flections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability Insurance in the Light of
Bar Chris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681 (1969).
8 See WASHINGTON & BISHOP.
9 It is a premise of this note that indemnification or insurance should be available to
corporate management for liability only under color of official action. The question of
insurance or indemnification for "outside" or personal activities in the form of compen-
sation or remuneration is thus beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion of these
issues see WASHINGTON & BISHOP at 6-19. However, any activity which is ostensibly
undertaken in the capacity as corporate manager, even though against the corporation's
best interests, will be treated herein.
10 In stockholder derivative actions, an unsuccessful officer or director had little hope
of gaining reimbursement from the corporation. See, e.g., Wickersham v. Crittenden,
106 Cal. 329, 39 P. 603 (1895); General Mtg. & Loan Corp. v. Guaranty Mtg. & Sec.
Corp., 264 Mass. 253, 162 N.E. 319 (1928). Yet if the manager acted in good faith, he
might be reimbursed for expenses. See, e.g., Albrecht, McGuire & Co. v. General Plas-
tics, Inc., 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1930). The director's liability must have
arisen from actions performed in his corporate managerial capacity if any reimbursement
were to be justified. See Jesse v. Four Wheel Drive Auto Co., 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W.
276 (1922).
The truly confusing development in the area, to both corporate management and the
corporate bar, was the coming of the "benefit theory." See WASHINGTON & BISHOP at
85. In Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931), an Ohio court spawned
the benefit theory by .apparently misinterpreting an earlier New York case, Godley v.
Crandell & Godley Co., 153 App. Div. 697, 139 N.Y.S. 236 (1912). The Ohio court re-
quired the successful directors to show that there was'a benefit flowing to the corpora-
tion from their successful defense of a stockholder suit. In Godley the directors were
found to be guilty, yet because some benefit of their actions inured to the corporation,
[Vol. 50:826
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actions brought under the federal securities law; nevertheless, an ex-
amination of the history of the concept and the development of the
various theories of indemnification should provide some guidance for
its applicability to third party actions.1
Common Law Development
Prior to 1939, case law dealing with corporate manager indemni-
fication was unsettled. In that year New York Dock Co. v. McCollom 2
was decided, epitomizing the confusion in the common law concept of
indemnification. In McCollom, a New York court found that directors,
successful on the merits in a stockholders' suit, were required to show
some benefit flowing to the corporation before the corporation would
be justified in reimbursing their expenses. This benefit had to be
something more than merely winning the suit, since, in the opinion of
the court, the attorneys retained by the corporation had performed the
services resulting in the exoneration of the corporation. Rather, the
director needed to show substantial benefit flowing to the corporation
from his successful defense 3 in order to be reimbursed. McCollom,
together with the later case of Baily v. Bush Terminal Co.,"4 express
the rule that
no common law right to recover reimbursement exists, and
in the absence of contract or statute, a director who successfully
defends an action brought against him by his corporation or in
its behalf cannot require the corporation to reimburse him..
Statutory Development
McCollom set off a wave of both statutes and corporate bylaw
they could then require the corporation to use its funds to defend the stockholders' suit.
By way of comparison, the English Companies Act, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 23, § 152(c)
(1929), allows the court to relieve an officer of liability for negligence, default, breach
of duty, or breach of trust if he acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be
excused.
"ZFor a general discussion of indemnification as a whole, the classic study is
WASHINGTON & BISHOP. Reference should also be made to 3 L. Loss, SEculTiEs REGU-
LAT'IoN 1829-36 (2d ed. 1961) ; 6 id. 3977-82 (2d ed. Supp. 1969) ; Bishop, Sitting Ducks
and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Ofi-
cers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968) ; Bishop, New Problems in Indimnifying and Insuring
Directors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 Duan
L.J. 1153; Symposium, Officers' and Directors' Responsibilities rnd Liabilities, 27 Bus.
LAW. 1 (Feb. 1972 Special Issue) ; Note, Public Policy in Directors' Liability Inmurance,
67 CoLum. L. Ray. 717 (1967).
12 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
13 Id. at 111.
"446 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mere., 267 App. Div. 899, 48 N.Y.S.2d 324
(1943), aff'd inem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56 N.E.2d 739 (1944).
15 46 N.Y.S.2d at 880.
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provisions to facilitate indemnification. New York was the first state
to act, 6 followed by many of the rest of the states of the Union. 7
These statutes, when first enacted, were generally of two types.
One type (enabling statutes) allowed the corporation to provide for
indemnification through bylaws, but was limited to those situations in
which a director or officer was adjudged not culpable for willful mis-
feasance or gross negligence. 8 The other type of statute conferred a
qualified right on insiders to be indemnified when successful on the merits
at litigation.'9 A few states passed statutes combining these two
types.2" These statutes have been amended in the intervening years.
Yet until the 1960's, the statutes generally followed the aforementioned
classifications. However, two important issues were left unresolved.
One issue involved a director who was made a party to an action
merely because of his status as a director."' However, the newest Del-
aware statute22 makes indemnification available so long as the manager
was acting "in a manner . . . not opposed to the best interests of
the corporation.. "23 This phrasing would seem to cover situations
where the manager is not necessarily acting in his corporate capacity,
but is being sued because of his status as an insider.
The second issue not generally covered by the original statutes
was the third party action. The statutes had been thought to be applic-
able only to the derivative suit. 4 However, some of the statutes have
been amended or reenacted so as to cover, to some extent, the third
Is [1941] N.Y. Sess. L. 1941, ch. 209, § 27a, ch. 350, § 61-a.
17ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.009(15) (1962); CAL. Coap. CODE § 830 (West 1955);
CoLO. REv. STAT. § 7-3-101(o) (1973) ; D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904(p) (1973); IND. ANN.
STAT. § 23-1-2-2(b) (10) (Code ed. 1972) ; IowA CODE § 496A.4(15) (1971); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271.375 (1972); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 719 (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, § 64 (1957); MICH. Come. LAws § 450.10-! (1948); MINN. STAT. § 301.095
(1971); Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.355 (1959) ; NEn. REv. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (Supp. 1974);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 78.751 (1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-20 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §
10-19-04(15) (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page 1964); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 57.255 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 15, §§ 410, 1410 (1967); TEX. Bus. CORP. Act
art. 2.02(16) (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o) (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1
(1950); Wis. STAT. § 180.04(14) (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(o) (1957).
18E.g, CoLo. REv. STAT. 7-3-101(o) (1973) ; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E)
(Page 1964).
19 E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 410, 1410 (1967).
20Most notably the original New York Act, [1941] N.Y. Sess. L. 1941, ch. 209, §
27a, ch. 350, § 61-a.
21 This is precisely the problem encountered in suits brought under section 16(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), and in some instances
those suits brought under section 10(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970).22 The Delaware statute has often served as a model for other states. Compare DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1974), with, e.g., statutes cited note 17 supra.
23DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 145(a)-(b) (1974).
24 Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities
and Antitrust Legislation, 76 Hagv. L. REv. 1403, 1406 (1963).
[Vol. 50:826
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party suit. For example, the Delaware statute was reenacted in 1968
to cover situations in which an insider is judged liable in third party
actions.25 The insider may be indemnified if
he acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed
to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation,
and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no
reasonable cause to believe his conduct was unlawful.2
Other statutes have dealt with the third party suit by adding the words
"civil or criminal" in describing the type of actions covered. 2' The
Indiana statute is representative of these legislative provisions:
(b) Subject to any limitations or restrictions imposed by law
or the articles of incorporation, each corporation shall have the
following general rights, privileges and powers:
(9) to indemnify any person who is or was a director, officer...
of the corporation . . . against expenses reasonably incurred
by him in connection with the defense of any action, suit or pro-
ceeding, civil or criminal, in which he is made or threatened to be
made, a party by reason of being or having been in any such
capacity, or arising out of his status as such, except in relation to
matters as to which he is adjudged in such action suit or proceed-
ing, civil or criminal, to be liable for negligence or misconduct
in the performance of duty to the corporation .... 28
25 8 Del. C. 1953 § 145; 56 Del. Laws, C. 50; 56 Del. Laws, C. 186, § 6; 57 Del.
Laws, C. 421 § 2.
26 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (a) (1974).
27 E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (a) (Supp. 1973) ; MoDEL BUSINESS Co'PRA-
TioN Acr § 5, in ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. AcT. ANN. (2d cd. 1971).
28 IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-2-2(b) (9) (Code ed. Supp. 1974) (emphasis added). In
addition, the Indiana statute, in section 23-1-2-2(b) (10), grants the corporation the power
to insure the manager
against any liability asserted against him and incurred by him in any such ca-
pacity, or arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation
would have the power to indemnify him against such liability under the provi-
sions of this section.
Insurance, on the whole, is more widely available under the indemnification statutes, than
is indemnification proper. It seems to be a compromise between the full indemnification
by the corporation, and no support whatsoever for the manager. The premiums for this
insurance are generally paid by the corporation, and may be vie-wed as a form of com-
pensation. While such provision reduces the load on the corp ration by spreading the
risk outside the circle of corporate players, and may thereby ,ircumvent any lingering
common law "benefit" requirements, such a program is still open to many of the same
objections raised against indemnification. While the standard policy excludes situations
in which the manager is held liable for wanton or intentional violations, the in terrorem
effect of the laws is significantly diluted. The director or officer may thus be encouraged
to act recklessly, without regard to possible legal consequences. For a more de-
tailed and complete discussion of these concepts and the coverage of these insurance
policies see WASHINGTON & BISHOP, supra note 6, at 75; 3 L. Loss, SEcURITIES REGULA-
TION 1834 n.498 (2d ed. 1961) ; Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a First Public Offer-
1975]
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New York and California have attempted to deal comprehensively
with third party situations.' For example, the New York Business
Corporation Law provides that the corporation may provide indemni-
fication for any person
made, or threatened to be made, a party to an action or proceeding
* * * whether civil or criminal; [brought to impose a liability
or penalty on such person as a director or officer of the corpora-
tion] against judgments, fines, amounts paid in settlement and
reasonable expenses, including attorneys' fees . . . if [he]
acted, in good faith, for a purpose which he reasonably believed
to be in the best interests of the corporation and, in criminal
actions or proceedings, in addition, had no reasonable cause to
believe that his conduct was unlawful.30
No statute limits the indemnification of the manager who is success-
ful on the merits in third party actions."' The situations in between,
that is, settlement before adjudication on the merits, 2 pleas of nolo
contendere-s suits won on technical or procedural grounds,84 or pro-
ceedings, hearings or investigations in which liability is not normally
assessed," however, have led to some inconclusive results. Some courts
have even allowed indemnification of the loser.3 These statutory de-
ing, 15 Bus. LAW. 539, 552 (1960); Applebaum & McDowell, Indemnification Against
Securities Acts Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 131 (Feb. 1972 Special Issue) ; Hensey, Delan-
cey, Stahl & Kramer, What Existing D & 0 Policies Cover, 27 Bus. LAW. 147 (Feb.
1972 Special Issue); Note, Liability Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 Hv. L.
Ruv. 648 (1967); Note, Public Policy in Directors' Liability Insurance, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 716 (1967).
29 N.Y. Bus. CoaR. LAw §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963); CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(f)
(West Supp. 1975).
s0 N.Y. Bus. Cone. LAW § 723(a) (McKinney 1963). Just who is to make the de-
termination on the factual issues presented by such a statute shall be treated at text ac-
companying note 125 infra. The choice seems limited to the courts, the corporation's
board of directors (or at least a disinterested majority thereof), some third party (of a
quasi-official nature), or the corporation's stockholders.
31 See, however, the earlier common law cases discussed at note 12 supra & text ac-
companying.32 See, e.g., Kansas City Operating Corp. v. Durwood, 278 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1960);
Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1953).
33 See, e.g., Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942) (based on the benefit inuring to the corporation from the plea of nolo con-
tendere).
34See, e.g., Tomash v. Midwest Technical Dev. Corp., 281 Minn. 21, 160 N.W.2d
273 (1968).
35 See the categorization used by Bates & Zuckert, Directors' Indemnity: Corporate
Policy or Public Policy?, 20 HARv. Bus. Rzv. 244 (1942). This article, which is based on
a study of some 169 indemnification agreements, also points to the immediate reaction by
the corporate community to Newu York Dry Dock Co. v. McCollom and related decisions.
The authors note that without the indemnification agreements, outside directors were be-
coming increasingly reluctant to serve. Id. at 246.
so DePinto v. Landoe, 411 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1969) (indermification by another
[Vol. 50:826
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velopments and judicial interpretations illustrate an increasing concern
on the part of state governments to insulate the corporate manager from
an expanding possibility of personal financial disaster. In 1940, when
much of this development began, holding corporate managers to a
high level of accountability was a fairly recent occurrence.8 7 Thus the
two concepts, indemnification and responsibility, have had a chron-
ologically parallel development. However, manager indemnification and
responsibility in third party situations are recent and still unfolding
concepts. Application of state indemnification policies to allow com-
pensation of damaged individuals and to remedy harm caused by a
director's breach of duty in areas largely governed by state law is
laudable. However, broad statutory provisions authorizing indemnifica-
tion and insurance, even in cases where directors have been adjudged
liable3 "cannot be decisive. . . to the extent that it may be inconsistent
with the provisions or policies of the federal acts."3 The possibility
that such indemnification can be applied under the Williams Act de-
pends on whether, and in what situations, such indemnification is in
accord with the policy and purpose of that legislation. An examination
of the application of indemnification under the general range of federal
corporate laws can lend some guidance for indemnifying corporate
managers during contests for corporate control.
FEDERAL LAW TREATMENT OF INDEMNIFICATION
By Statute
From the manager's viewpoint, director liability under the federal
securities acts has been expanding at an alarming rate.4° The securities.
acts themselves do not face the problem of indemnification directly.
The basic purpose of the acts was to correct the causes and faults
in the securities market which led to the economic conditions of the
1930's. Disclosure and information were to be the keys."' Disclosure
would turn the "white light of publicity" 2 on activity and would, it was
hoped, discourage any questionable transactions. Information would
wrongdoer based on a contract is permissible) ; Simon v. Socorty-Vacuum Oil Co., 179
Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct 1942).
z7 See Bates & Zuckert, supra note 35, at 245.
88 DL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Rev. 1974).
89 3 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 1830 (2d ed. 1961).
40 Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in, the Indemnification of
Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968).
41 See, e.g., Landis, The Legislative History of the Securiti's Act of x933, 28 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 29 (1959); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securitzes Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171 (1933).
4278 CONG. REc. 7925 (1934).
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allow the investor to make intelligent decisions. Liability for violation
of the acts would have a two-fold purpose: first, to compensate vic-
tims of deviate transactions and, second, to provide an in terrorem
effect to discourage violation and, therefore, prevent compensable loss."
Indemnification is viewed as contrary to the in terrorem purpose.
Other federal legislation enacted during the period of economic
reconstruction in the 1930's and 1940's may shed some light on the
problem of indemnification. Sections 12(f) and (g) of the Public
Utilfty Holding Company Act of 1935"4 grant to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) power to pass upon indemnification
agreements. The Commission has approved those provisions which
allow indemnification of successful officers and directors, and indemnifi-
cation for actions which were taken in good faith.-" Washington and
Bishop relate that the SEC has set out a model bylaw provision, but due
to its dearth of clarity, the provision fails to shed any light on the Com-
mission's position.46
The Trust Indenture Act47 contains a provision allowing the trustee
to assess the trust for costs of defending his actions (with some excep-
tions) unless the trustee's actions are adjudged negligent.4"
Section 11 (f) of the Securities Act of 193349 provides for contri-
bution from any person who would have been liable if sued separately.
Thus, if the corporation is sued for misstatements in the registration
statement, it could demand contribution from the directors and vice-
versa. The Act does not forbid indemnification in the form of an
agreement which would bar the corporation from seeking contribution
from the directors.5" (This section does not apply to a person guilty
of fraud.)
The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken a restrictive
43See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1830-31 (2d ed. 1961).
"49 Stat. 803 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970).
45 See WASHINGTON & BISHOP at 244-45; Purcell, Foster & Hill, Enforcing the Ac-
countability of Corporate Management and Related Activities of the S.E.C., 32 VA. L.
REv. 497, 517 & n.57 (1945).
46 WASHINGTON & BISHOP at 245.
47 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970).
48 53 Stat. 1149 (1939), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1970).
4948 Stat. 83 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970).
All or any one or more of the persons specified in subsection (a) of this
section shall be jointly and severally liable, and every person who becomes liable
to make any payment under this section may recover contribution as in cases of
contract from any person who, if sued separately, would have been liable to make
the same payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other
was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.
Id.
50 Douglas & Bates, supra note 41, at 178-79.
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view of indemnification. Under the Securities Act of 1933, the Com-
mission requires that to obtain acceleration of the statutory 20-day
waiting period following the filing of a corporation's pricing amend-
ment to a registration statement,51 the registrant must comply with note
(a) under rule 460." The registrant, whenever it appears that there
is any possibility of the corporation indemnifying its officers or direc-
tors, must obtain waiver of the indemnification agreement. If waiver
is not obtained, the registration statement must disclose the substance
of the agreement and include a statement that, in the view of the Com-
mission, the agreement "is against public policy as expressed in the act
and is, therefore, unenforceable."" Further, except for indemnification
of expenses to successful officers or directors, enforcement of the
agreement must be submitted to a court unless, in the opinion of the
registrant's counsel, the matter is settled by controlling precedent." This
procedure (known as the "Johnson & Johnson" formula 5 ) represents
the Commission's most lucid statement on indemnification under the
securities acts.
The Commission believes that only the expenses of a successful
manager may be reimbursed commensurate with the policy and objec-
tives of the Securities Act. Thus, expenses from a settlement, regard-
less of the manager's innocence, would not be indemnified. Yet, ex-
penses from a suit dismissed on technical grounds, no matter how
culpable the manager, may be indemnified without violating the policy
of the Act.
The aforementioned federal acts were passed prior to the McColtom
case, and prior to the passage of the various state indemnification pro-
visions. Indeed, these federal acts were passed prior to the beginning
of the era in which directors and officers were held to high standards of
accountability."0
Amidst these developments on the state level, the Investment Com-
51 This acceleration power, which is the SEC's main enforcement weapon, is based
on section 8(a) of the Securities Act, 48 Stat. 79 (1933). The Commission uses the ac-
celeration power to promote the standards set forth in section 8(a). As a practical mat-
ter, acceleration is necessary for a successful offering. During the waiting period, market
conditions are likely to change, often causing the underwriters to refuse to proceed.
Thus, compliance with rule 460 is, in effect, required before an offering.
02 17 C.F.R. § 230.460 n. (a) (1974). Although this rule has been in effect formally
since 1957, there has yet been no judicial holding squarely consieering its validity.
03 Id.
5 Id.
55 The formula is so named after the corporation that was first subjected to its
application.
rG See Comment, Distribution of Risk Imposed upon Corporate Oficials by Federal
Securities Legislation, 49 YALE L.J. 1423 (1940) ; Bates & Zuckert, supra note 35.
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pany Act was passed in 1940. 7 That act, in section 17(h) , contains
the only federal legislation dealing directly with indemnification of
corporate insiders. Section 17(h) is phrased in the negative, providing
that no indemnification can be had by the director if liability is based
on his "willful misfeasance, bad faith, gross negligence or reckless dis-
regard of the duties involved in the conduct of his office." '59 Despite an
early interpretation by the SEC which would have significantly nar-
rowed section 17(h) ,1 the Commission has not yet rejected any broad
bylaws making full use of its provisions."
Neither the securities acts nor the Commission provide meaningful
guidance for the application of indemnification provisions. The courts
have interpreted the policy of the securities regulations and applied
indemnification statutes and bylaws on a number qf occasions, in some
cases perhaps a little more liberally than the Commission would like. 2
Judicial Construction
Globus v. Law Research Service Inc.6" was a suit brought by 13
purchasers of an issue of common stock of Law Research Service,
charging violations of sections 12(2)"4 and 17(a)65 of the Securities
Act and sections 10(b) 6 and 15(c) 7 of the Exchange Act. The de-
57 Act of Aug. 22, 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
1581d. § 80a-17(h).
159 Id. See WASHINGTON & BIsI-Iop at 163-64.
60 SEC ANN. RFP. 16 (1941).
61 See WASHINGTON & BISHOP at 165-66. In a recent pronouncement, the Commis-
sion staff recommended that a no-action letter issue with regard to an investment com-
pany bylaw which was limited to indemnification of expenses, and did not specifically
cover liability. Dodge and Cox Balanced Fund, [1972-1973] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
79,160.
02 Other than the "Johnson & Johnson" formula, SEC position statements have been
few and far between. Since this area is of increasing importance, it is hoped that the
Commission will take a more vocal role in future developments. But WASHINGTON &
BISHOP, at 248, voiced the same concern in 1942, and again in 1963, apparently to no
avail. Perhaps the method of amicus curiae adopted in Feit v. Leasco, discussed infra
note 78 & text accompanying, marks a new offensive in the area by the Commission.
It is very significant that while the SEC has seemingly condemned indemnification in
this situation, the Commission has not so condemned the use of officers' and directors'
insurance. It certainly seems that the same objections that the SEC raises against in-
demnification would be applied to insurance. Yet, apparently, the Commission does not
feel this way, allowing insurance for managers violating the securities acts, even if the
insurance premiums are paid by the corporation. See Bishop, New Problems in Indeinni-
fying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1972 DuKE L.J. 1153, 1159.
61287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
6448 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
6548 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
6048 Stat. 891 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
6749 Stat. 1377 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1970).
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fendant underwriter filed a counterclaim based on -.n indemnity agree-
ment with the corporation. It was held that an underwriter found
guilty of actions graver than ordinary negligence could not enforce
an indemnification agreement as this would be against the public policy
embodied in the federal securities legislation.8 The underwriter re-
plied that the plaintiff investor would be made whole anyway by re-
imbursement from the issuer. To this the district court replied:
If an underwriter were to be permitted to escape liability
for its own misconduct by obtaining indemnity from the insurers,
it would have less an incentive to conduct a thorough investiga-
tion . . . than it would be [sic] if the indemnity was unenforce-
able under such circumstances.6
The district court limited this finding to "circumstances where
[the underwriter] has been found guilty of misconduct eyincing actual
knowledge or reckless disregard ...."T'
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in affirming the
district court, added that cases which uphold indemnification focus on
compensation of the investor.7' However, the Securities Act is more
concerned with prevention than cure."'
The policy announced in Globus, while not drawn from the ac-
tivities of a director, is applicable to the director's position. The em-
phasis is on the in terrorern effect which the possibility of liability has
on the director.
A section 10(b) 73 case, Baumel v. Rosen, 74 decided by the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held that the plaintiff-sellers were
entitled only to damages from the defendant-corporation, and not to
recission, even for an apparently deliberate violation of the statute. The
court found that the purpose of section 10(b) was compensatory and not
punitive. Although not involving indemnification, one can assert that,
if section 10(b) is compensatory, the in terrorem effect of denying in-
demnification is outweighed by a policy to provide compensation, and
18 287 F. Supp. at 199, 418 F.2d at 1278.
69 287 F. Supp. at 199.
70d.
71 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
72418 F.2d 1276, 1285-86. It should be observed that the lower court in this case
had imposed punitive damages, which certainly add to the deterrent effect. The appellate
court denied the award. The appellate court sought uniformity with the Exchange Act
which, in section 28(a), 48 Stat. 903 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 7.3bb(a) (1970), prohibits
punitive damages in actions under that act
7348 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).




that such a policy provides sufficient bases for indemnification.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.5 involved an
exchange tender offer to which the Williams Act was inapposite at the
time."' The suit was brought against the offeror corporation, several of
its officers, the underwriter and the dealer-managers by target share-
holders who tendered their shares in exchange for the offeror's stock.
The action was based on an allegation of omissions from a registration
statement. The registrant failed to disclose that it had available
$100,000,000.00 of "surplus surplus." The court held this to be a ma-
terial omission.7  After the district court's opinion, defendant Leasco
announced that it would pay the judgment against the managers, in-
cluding attorney's fees, without asking for contribution from the man-
agers. The SEC viewed this as a declaration of intent to indemnify
the directors. The Commission filed an amicus brief, claiming in part:
The intent of Congress in passing § 11 was to stimulate diligence
on the part of persons actually responsible for the preparation
of registration statements. . . . Thus to allow directors to avoid
the consequences of their lack of diligence by indemnification
from the issuer would frustrate the Congressional purpose.7s
The directors ultimately paid token sums to the corporation and
the court found that this arrangement did not violate public policy. 9
When first passed, the federal regulatory framework was in reality
a substitute for a more comprehensive system 6f controls over securi-
ties."0 As such the preventative function of the system had to be stressed,
making the compensatory function of secondary importance. Yet, until
the courts could interpret the federal acts and clarify potential liability
7 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
716 The 1970 amendments to the Williams Act, 84 Stat 1497 (1970), amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 77c, 78c, m, n (1970), extended the Act's coverage to exchange as well as cash
tender offers.
77332 F. Supp. at 572. The court defined "surplus surplus" as being the excess of
the target insurance company's (Reliance) total surplus over that surplus required by
the regulations of the Insurance Commissioner of Pennsylvania. "Required surplus" is
"one that will be adequate to cover for a reasonable period of time any losses and ex-
penses larger than those predicted and any declines in asset values, including all chance
variations in the crucial factors of the operation." Id. at 550-51 quoting from STATE OF
NEW YORK INSURANcE DEP'T, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON INSURANCE HOLD-
ING COMPANIES 43 (1968).
78 Summary of Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Feit v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., Civ. No. 69-1329 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), in [1971-1972] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,415, at 92,046.
79 Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., Civ. No. 69-1329 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).80See Berle, High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 YALE REv. 20, 42 (1933). In-
deed, some individuals, for instance New York attorney (later Secretary of State) John
Foster Dulles, believed that the Securities Act would undermine the financial system l
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under them, there could be no real in terrorem effect. The policy of
the securities acts was to prevent and cure the cause of investor injury.'
This purpose has been borne out in subsequent litigation in which the
consequences of violation were defined, and teeth given the in terrorem
effect of the securitieg acts. 2
The federal securities regulation system seemed extensive, yet left
one important transaction, the cash tender offer, without significant
regulation.83 This omission was corrected in 1968 with the passage of
the Williams Act.8" What, then, are the policies of the Williams Act
with which indemnification would be consistent?
THE WILLIAMS ACT
The Williams Act is designed not as a method to compensate in-
jured investors, but as an informational, preventative measure by which
investor injury may be avoided.8 When Senator Williams introduced
81 Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 227 (1933). Com-
ment, Civil Liability for Misstatements in Documents Filed Under Securities Act and
Securities Exchange Act, 44 YALE L.J. 456 (1934).8 2 E.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) ; Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332 (1967).
83 In fact, Congress expected that the Exchange Act would provide protection from
"irresponsible outsiders seeking to wrest control of a corporation away from honest and
conscientious corporation officials." S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1934).
Such an expectation was not to be fulfilled, however, and the realization of this led to
the move for the tender offer legislation.
One especially glaring shortfall of the existing provision was the inability of a non-
tendering shareholder to utilize section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b)
(1970), to attack fraudulent activity in connection with a tender offer. He simply did
not have standing under the buyer-seller requirement of the "Birnbaum doctrine," Birn-
baum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952). See Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974).
It should be noted that when considering tender offer legislation, the Congress felt
that the exchange tender offer was adequately regulated by the existing securities provi-
sions. 113 CONG. REc. 854, 855 (1967). This view was later chamged and, in 1970, Con-
gress further amended the Exchange Act to include exchange tender offers within the
Williams Act provision. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497,
amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 78c, m, n (1970).
84 Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454.
85 The cash tender offer, as a method of acquisition, while not unknown in earlier
years, has been of increasing importance in the last decade. The use of the tender offer
vehicle by unscrupulous raiders who would, after a successful offer, loot the target com-
pany, seems to have precipitated the move toward the legislation. When first introduc-
ing the bill, Sen. Harrison Williams, in an address entitled "Protection Against Cor-
porate Raiders," 111 CONG. REc. 28, 257 (1965), called for a tighter disclosure rule that
would penalize a raider rather than a legitimate businessman. His main concern was
with the untaxed earnings of "illegal" companies being used to buy up stock without
stockholders knowledge. The legislation was considerably weaker than the comparable
British rule, and was viewed as placing "no obstacles in the way of honest and fairly
conducted transactions."
Congress failed to pass the legislation in 1965, and considerable debate arose in the
journals as to the need for such legislation. See, e.g., Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids
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the legislation in 196786 the emphasis and policy of the bill was in tune
with existing securities acts, i.e., investor protection was said to be
paramount."7 Disclosure akin to that required under the existing
securities acts was to be required in order to afford the stockholder the
opportunity to make a full and fair evaluation of the offer, and an
informed decision on whether or not to tender his shares.8
and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966); Manne, Cash Tender Of-
fers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE L.J. 231; Brudney, A Note on
Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTGERs L. Rxv. 609 (1967).
86 S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
87 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967). Perhaps one of the reasons for Sen. Williams' shift
of emphasis was the ongoing discussion of the legislation in legal journals. Manuel Co-
hen, chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, favored legislation requiring dis-
closure as the panacea for this troubled area. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966). Professor Henry G. Manne
opposed this view, saying that in the first place disclosure surely did not provide such a
cure-all and, in the second place, the raider served a very useful purpose of ridding the
corporate community of inefficient managers. He felt the investing public was sufficiently
protected by existing securities law. Manne, Cash Tender Offers For Shares-A Reply
to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuxE L.J. 231. Manne's most telling argument was that no
supporter of the legislation had demonstrated any case in which an investor had been
harmed because of the lack of legislation such as the Williams Act.
88 Senator Williams believed that a disclosure system, like that required under the
existing securities laws, would suffice to accomplish this purpose. He believed that the
decision whether to tender or not was substantially the same as the decision whether to
invest in the issue originally. It seems clear that such disclosure is not sufficient. The
most material piece of information the investor needs to make an intelligent derision is
the likelihood of the success of the offer. Such a degree of disclosure is not required
under the Williams Act. This may prove to vitiate the Act. See Brudney, A Note on
Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 609, 615 n.16, 617-18 (1967); Kennedy,
Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAW. 1091 (1968).
Under section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), one court, in passing
on the sufficiency of a raider's disclosure in an exchange tender offer, required that the
offeror disclose some evidence of the intensity of its desire to succeed in the exchange.
Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
It should be noted that such speculative disclosures, as of uncertain future plans, are not
required to be disclosed by an offeror. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
Becase of this lack of full disclosure of pertinent information and, as demonstrated
by Professor Manne, supra note 87, the lack of a clearly demonstrable need for the legis-
lation by the investing public, a plausible argument can be made that the 1967 bill had an
identical purpose with the purpose expressed for the 1965 bill, i.e., to protect incumbent
management from unscrupulous corporate raiders. The protection allegedly afforded the
investor seems sugar-coating to make the Act palatable and superficially reconcilable
with the existing securities acts. Indeed, one commentator notes that the courts, in in-
terpreting and applying the 'Williams Act provisions, have tended to be overprotective of
incumbent management. Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practi-
cal Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114 (1974). This judicial phenomenon may be ac-
counted for by two theories. First, courts have tended to interpret state indemnification
statutes to lend maximum protection to the manager. This seeming bastardization of
the Williams Act may be an extention of that development. The other theory may be
that the Act was drafted in such a way so as to allow incumbent management maximum
protection. Then the avowed purpose of the Act, demonstrated by the legislative history
and early judicial dicta, would simply be rhetoric or sugar-coating to facilitate the Act's
passage and acceptance by the corporate community.
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In addition to the disclosure requirements, the Williams Act also
contains a broad antifraud provision," which seeks to promote full
disclosure of all material information by any pers.on who would in-
fluence the investor's tender decision, or who would influence the results
of the contest for control.
From the provisions of the Act it can be seen that the intent and
policy of the legislation is forward looking. That is, the Act is
prophylactic. It is designed not as a method to compensate injured
investors, but as an informational, preventative measure by which in-
vestor injury can be avoided.
The courts have generally paid heed and at least lip service to this
avowed federal purpose and policy. In Electronic Specialty Co. v. In-
ternational Controls Corp.,9" the first appellate court case to judicially
interpret the Williams Act, the court said "the focus of legislative in-
terest was on the public shareholders; Congress wanted to ensure that
he had the benefit of a full statement from the offeror, with a chance
for 'incumbent management' to 'explain its position publicly' if so dis-
posed."'" In Cattlemen's Investment Co. v. Fears," the court says the
object of the Act is to
provide investors who hold equity interests in public corporations,
material information which respect to the potential impact of
any effort to acquire control of a company, sufficient time within
which to make an unhurried investment decision as to whether to
dispose of or retain their securities, and to assure fair treatment
of the investors 3
In H. K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co.,"' the court described
the purpose of the Williams Act as being to "regulate the emerging
'tender offer' takeover device in the interest of the investor." 5 The
court further stated, in refusing to dismiss a claim brought under
section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, 6 that the "overriding purpose of
89 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970). Under this section, the purchaser-seller standing re-
quirement (the Birnbaum doctrine) is done away with, and even nontendering share-
holders can invoke this provision. See Note, Remedies for Defrauded Tender Offerors
Under Section z4(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 62 GEo. L.J. 1693 (1974).
Thus, this fraud provision is expected to be as fruitful a source of litigation in this area
as section 10(b) of the Exchange Act is in the area of purchase and sale of securities.
90409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
91 Id. at 945. The court is quoting from H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1968).
92 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
93 Id. at 1251.
94482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
95 Id. at 423.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
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§ 14(e) is the protection of the investor.""7
Also, the court in Bath Industries, Inc. v. Blot98 noted that "the
protected class of investors includes both investors in general as well as
stockholders of the particular corporation involved."99
The manager may be held liable for violations of any section of
the Williams Act, whether he is a raider or target manager. The civil
liabilities for false or misleadng statements and omissions under sec-
tion 18 of the Exchange Act' 0 especially apply to the disclosure and
reporting requirements of sections 13(d),1O1 and 14(d) and (f).102
The criminal penalties imposed by sections 20(c)113 and 26104 of the
Exchange Act are equally applicable. In addition, section 9105 imposes
civil and criminal liability on any person who manipulates security
prices. Such activity could easily result from either raider's takeover
strategy or target's defensive maneuvers."°  Also section 14(e),'* the
antifraud provision of the Williams Act, promises to produce fertile
ground for manager liability akin to that developed under section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 of the Exchange Act."0 8
This liability has both an in terrorem and compensatory function.
Yet the purpose of the Williams Act is to prevent manager violation,
and to protect the investor, not merely to compensate him. Indemnifi-
cation is consonant with the compensation function, and, generally not
consonant with the preventative function.
INDEMNIFICATION AND THE WILLIAMs ACT
Application of the previously discussed statutory, judicial, and
97 482 F.2d at 424.
98427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970).
99Id. at 109. See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.
1974) ; Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Ron-
son Corp. v. Liquifin AG, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J. 1974).
100 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
10o 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1970).
10215 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d), (f) (1970).
103 15 U.S.C. § 78t(c) (1970).
101 15 U.S.C. § 78z (1970).
10515 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
106 See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW.
115 (1967); Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contest-
ing Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104 (1969).
107 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
10 See note 92 supra & text accompanying. For a further discussion of possible
manager liability under the Williams Act see Schwartz, Personal Liability of Directors
of an Acquiring Company, 4 MEaGERs & AcQuIsITioNS 4 (Mar.-Apr. 1969). Liability
under the securities acts generally is discussed in WASHiNGTON & BISHOP at 26; Ruder,




SEC positions to the Williams Act is theoretical at best. The public
policy expressed in the legislation would seem to be of the same cut
as that found in other securities regulations."°9 The Williams Act con-
tains no express declaration on indemnification, nor has the judiciary
yet ruled directly on the question, although the Feit v. Leasco case may
contain the key."'0 The SEC's position on the Williams Act should
align with its position on the rest of the federal securties legislation.
However, that position can only be surmised from the Commission's
position on indemnification in other securities areas. Applying the
"Johnson & Johnson" formula"' and considering the Commission's
amicus brief in Feit v. Leasco' 1 2 it may be argued that indemnification
should be allowed only when in accord with the policy of the securities
acts, and that policy dictates that only the successful manager be indemni-
fied. However, the Commission does not condemn insurance which
would have the same effect as indemnification." 3 This point is signi-
ficant. If insurance is permitted as consonant with the Act, the in
terrorem effect sought to be achieved by denying direct indemnification
is lost.'" While the Commission may not be able to prevent the
issuance of such insurance," 5 the treatment of insurance akin to the
"Johnson & Johnson" formula might have a similar effect. However,
the Commission has not acted in this area. As a result the Commis-
sion's position toward insurance is both inconsistent and, to a degree,
confusing.
A system, objective where possible, should be developed to give
guidance to parties involved in tender offers, as well as give greater
"09 See note 88 supra.
"10 See note 75 supra & text accompanying.
"'1 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
112 See text accompanying note 78 supra.
1's See Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability
Insurance in the Light of Bar Chris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAW. 681 (1969).
114 That is insurance which will reimburse the corporation for payments it must
make when the manager's actions result in liability on the part of the corporation, and
reimburse the manager himself for liability because of his "wrongful acts." "Wrongful
acts" are defined in the basic Lloyds, Ltd. form as: "Any breach of duty, neglect, error,
misstatement, misleading statement, omission or other act done or wrongfully attempted
by (the individual Assureds) or any of the foregoing so alleged by any claimant or any
matter claimed against them solely by reason of their being such (Directors or Officers
or Assureds) " Hinsey, Delancey, Stahl & Kramer, What Existing D & 0 Policie
Cover, 27 Bus. LAW. 147 (Feb. 1972 Special Issue).
It should be noted that these policies do not cover fines or penalties imposed by law,
nor any matter which would be deemed "legally uninsurable." THs term is based on the
law of the state whose indemnification statute is being applied.
115 The Commission would seem to have no direct power to forbid the issuance of
these policies. Pressure on the states to control in-state insurers would only serve to re-
quire the "Assureds" to go to London to obtain coverage.
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than illusory effect to the purported policy of investor protection. This
system must attempt to balance the two competing policies, i.e., to com-




Indemnification of managers who are successful on the merits
would have no real debilitating effect on the statute or its prophylactic
policy. Such a provision would serve to benefit the corporation and the
corporate community. It encourages the manager to defend the cor-
poration, its policies, the stockholders, himself and his office. The
Commission would not disagree with this.
Willful Violation or Gross Neglect
The situation in which the manager is adjudged guilty of willful
violation of the law, or gross neglect of his corporate duties, would seem
clearly non-indemnifiable. While there may be a strong need to com-
pensate' in such situations, the balance must shift in favor of enforc-
ing the prophylactic policy of the Act. The inability of the manager to
be reimbursed for his expenses in defending his actions may have a
serious in terrorem effect. The same can be said for fines and penalties
which may be assessed against him. 17 In such cases, any civil liability
should not be indemnifiable either. Though this may leave the injured
investor without proper compensation, such a provision would lessen
the incentive to the manager not to comply with the Act.""
Criminal Proceedings
In criminal proceedings under the Act, another policy must be
acknowledged. That is the public policy that a defendant in a criminal
cases have counsel to represent him. This policy should be ignored only
118 Ie., create a "deep pocket."
11- These fines and penalties are uninsurable under the standard policy, and, generally,
unindemnifiable under state statutes. See Hinsey, Delancey, Stahl & Kramer, supra note
114.
118 Actions brought under section 14(e) (the fraud provision) may be thought to
elevate the compensation function to pre-eminence under the theory of Baumel v. Rosen,
412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1969). See note 70 supra & text accompanying. Section 14(e) is
very much like section 10(b) and might be thought of as a compensatory provision. How-
ever, the courts, particularly the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in H.K. Porter
Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1973), found section 14(e) designed to promote




when it "might not frustrate a sharply defined national or state policy
proscribing particular types of conduct.""' After a director was found
guilty of securities act violations in Commissioner v. Tellier,"° he was
allowed a tax deduction for legal fees as an ordinary and necessary
expense.
Therefore, while there is no compensatory function involved, the
strongly articulated public policy of providing counsel seems to outweigh
the in terrorem effect. Penalties and fines should provide sufficient in-
centive to comply. Legal expenses in criminal cases should, therefore,
be indemnifiable when the manager is sued in his corporate capacity."'
Terminated Litigation
The situations in between the extremes of culpability and innocence,
those consisting of litigation and threatened litigation that cease prior
to adjudication on the merits, represent a more perplexing area."
When an action is terminated on technical grounds resulting only in the
incurrence of defense expenses, there seems little reason to deny in-
demnification. The manager should be encouraged to defend his office
and himself (as stockholder's chosen representative) in groundless,
nuisance or strike suits.
However, when a settlement results in liability or a plea of nolo
contendere23 results in a fine, a more complicated situation is pre-
sented. In some settlements the manager may be guilty of some deviate
behavior, but can capitalize on a weakness in his opponent's case. In
other settlements he may be innocent, yet to minimize expenses, or avoid
adverse publicity, may find it wiser to settle. To allow indemnification
across the board in settlement situations would surely damage the in
terrorem effect of the Act. The Delaware statute allolvs such indemni-
"19 Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
120 383 U.S. 687 (1966). See also Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
'
21 When the director or officer is sued for criminal actions undertaken outside his
corporate capacity, there seems to be no justification for permitting the corporation to
pay the expenses.
122 See Bates & Zuckert, Director's Indemnity: Corporate Policy or Public Policy?,
20 HARv. Bus. Rnv. 244 (1942).
123The two cases which have allowed indemnification after nolo contendere pleas,
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942) ,
aff'd inim., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944), and Koster v. Warren, 297 F.2d
418 (9th Cir. 1961), both depend too heavily on a benefit theory and a contract theory, ig-
noring the prophylactic purpose of the antitrust legislation involv.d in the cases.
The plea of nolo contendere, while not strictly an admission of guilt, does result in
sentence being imposed as if guilt were admitted. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421,
426 (1961). However, since such pleas often result after negotiations between the ad-
versaries, these cases are classed, for the purposes of this note, with settlements.
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fication."'2 Other statutes, such as those of New York" and Califor-
nia 2 . call on the board of directors or the court to determine whether
the managers should be indemnified, based on the facts of each case.
Such a system, while lacking objectivity, promises to be fariest to both
managers and the investing public. The court should be asked to approve
an indemnification scheme in these questionable areas, seeking guidance
from a disinterested board of directors or from the stockholders them-
selves, where possible. Such a procedure would allow indemnification
for the manager, while providing a viable watchdog system to protect
investor interest.
Adjudication of Negligence
When the manager is negligent, the balance is tipped more in
favor of compensation through indemnification.'27 The English Com-
panies Act 2 ' allows the court to exonerate a director if he is found to
have acted in good faith compliance with the law. However, to allow
indemnification in all such circumstances would only serve to encourage
reckless conduct, and discourage reasonable investigation. Thus, in this
situation also, the court should be asked to rule on the advisability of
indemnification.
THE INSURANcE ALTERNATIVE
Insurance, if allowed across the board, would do great harm to
the in terrorem effect of the Williams Act. Insurance should be limited
to the extent that it is available only in situations where in-
demnification was available. Statutes allowing insurance in cases in
which the corporation may not indemnify the manager 29 are based on
the desire to compensate the victim in derivative actions. These pro-
visions should be seen as not applicable because of their debilitating
effect on the in terrorem function of the Williams Act. State legislation
should be structured in such a way so as to limit the use of insurance
programs to situations where their application, in lieu of indemnifica-
tion, would be consistent with the policies of the federal securities laws.
Such a structuring would serve to encourage the manager to utilize his
talents to maximum benefit while sparing the corporation a possibly
12 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 8 145 (1974).
125 N.Y. Bus. Com. LAW §8 721-26 (1963).
12 CAL. Corp. CODE § 830(f) (West 1957).
127 Compare Companies Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 448(1) (1948), with CAL.
Cons. CODE § 830(f) (West 1957) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 145 (1974).
'128 Companies Act, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, ch. 38, § 448(1) (1948).
12 9 IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-2-2(b) (10) (Code ed. Supp. 1974). See note 28 supra.
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debilitating expense.
CONCLUSIONS
The indemnification scheme set out above is as objective as pos-
sible. Objectivity is necessary in order to allay the manager's fears
that he will meet with financial disaster if he, in good faith, acts by
and for the corporation. Objectivity also makes it clear to the manager
who would abuse the Williams Act that he does so at his own risk. The
subjective, judicial application of indemnification and insurance in
settlement and nolo contendere situations gives the innocent manager
an opportunity to prevent unwarranted expense and adverse publicity
without absorbing heavy financial burdens. Yet it also prevents the
culpable manager from exploiting technicalities to the detriment of the
corporation.
EDWARD J. HUSSEY
